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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—WHERE DOES IT FIT? SOLVING THE SCHOOL
BOARD PRAYER PUZZLE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized the constitutionality of opening legislative meetings with prayers.1 The Court first
announced the legislative prayer exception to the Establishment Clause in
Marsh v. Chambers.2 But do opening prayers at a school board meeting fit
within the legislative prayer exception? This question sits at the intersection
of school prayer practices prohibited by the Establishment Clause and legislative prayer practices allowed under the exception.3 In 2017, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld prayers at the beginning
of school board meetings as constitutional.4 However, just a year later, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down school
board prayer as a violation of the Establishment Clause,5 creating a circuit
split.6 In December 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc of its
decision.7 Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain wrote a scathing opinion in protest
of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to deny rehearing.8 Seven other judges joined
O’Scannlain’s opinion, underscoring the divergent views on this issue.9
This Note examines the recently created circuit split and argues that the
Supreme Court of the United States should take up this important constitutional question and decide it under the legislative prayer cases. School board
prayer fits within the legislative prayer exception because school boards are
public deliberative bodies, school board meetings do not implicate the concerns that led to the Supreme Court’s school prayer decisions, and school
1. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
2. Id.
3. Paul Imperatore, Note, Solemn School Boards: Limiting Marsh v. Chambers to Make
School Board Prayer Unconstitutional, 101 GEO. L.J. 839, 841 (2013).
4. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2017).
5. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. (Chino Valley I), 896 F.3d 1132, 1148 (9th Cir. 2018).
6. See McCarty, 851 F.3d at 529–30 (holding that a school district’s policy of inviting
students to deliver invocations before monthly board meetings is constitutional).
7. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
(Chino Valley II), 910 F.3d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 2018).
8. Id. at 1298 (O’Scannlain, J., joined by Rawlinson, Bybee, Callahan, Bea, Ikuta,
Bennett, & R. Nelson, JJ., opinion respecting the denial of rehearing en banc). Ninth Circuit
judges in senior status cannot cast votes on en banc petitions, but they can take part in discussions on en banc proceedings. That is why O’Scannlain’s opinion is an opinion respecting
denial rather than a dissent from the denial.
9. Id. at 1299.
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board prayers fit within the historical tradition of legislative prayers. Moreover, there are adequate constitutional limits on school board prayer practices even under the exception. School board prayer practices may not unconstitutionally denigrate unbelievers or coerce participation, prayer givers
must be selected in a nondiscriminatory fashion, and prayers should be directed primarily at school board members.
Part II below provides a brief overview of the relevant Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Part III explains the legislative prayer exception to the
Establishment Clause. Part IV examines the circuit split regarding whether
prayers at public school board meetings fit within that exception. Part V
argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in McCarty and of Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion, should the Court address the constitutionality of school board prayer. Part VI explains that there
are still meaningful constitutional limits on prayers before school board
meetings.
II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OVERVIEW
The First Amendment’s religion clauses provide that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”10 These two clauses are known as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, respectively. It has been suggested that
the religion clauses, together, “insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.”11
The Establishment Clause has played a particularly salient role in cases
involving religious practices in public schools. Over the last half-century,
the Supreme Court has consistently struck down religious practices in the
public school context.12 For example, in 1962, the Court held that recitation
of a state-composed prayer during school contravened the Establishment
Clause.13 A year later, the Court held that recitation of the Lord’s Prayer or
Bible readings at the beginning of the school day violated the Establishment
Clause.14 In 1992, the Court struck down prayer offered by clerical members
during a high school graduation ceremony.15 More recently, the Court held

10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
12. A thorough study of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this
Note, but a brief summary of relevant cases is helpful to understand the difficulty of deciding
whether school board prayer is constitutional.
13. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
14. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
15. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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that prayer by a student prior to a high school football game violated the
Establishment Clause.16
The Court’s stance toward religion in public schools is due in large part
to the “heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.”17
Additionally, the Court has emphasized that attendance at school is mandatory, and that attendance at some school events is quasi-mandatory.18 Because of the jurisprudential trend toward striking down religious practices in
public schools, classifying a school board meeting as a school activity essentially decides the case.19
In fact, when the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and
Sixth Circuits decided school board prayer cases prior to the Supreme
Court’s Town of Greece20 decision, those courts relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s hard line with respect to prayer in the public school context.21
In line with the Supreme Court school prayer cases, the courts in both of
those decisions found school board prayer to be unconstitutional.22
Despite the Establishment Clause’s significance in the public school
context, it is important to note that “while the First Amendment ‘reflects the
philosophy that Church and State should be separated,’ ‘[it] does not say
that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State.’”23 The government must refrain from favoring religion, but the First
Amendment does not permit hostility toward religion.24

16. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
17. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 592.
18. See, e.g., id. at 586 (“Even for those students who object to the religious exercise,
their attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real
sense obligatory, though the school district does not require attendance as a condition for
receipt of the diploma.”).
19. See Phillip Buckley, We Call Them School Boards for a Reason: Why School Board
Prayer Still Violates the Establishment Clause, 8 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 71, 77 (2019)
(“Given that the courts in Indian River and Coles held that the Supreme Court’s school prayer
precedent applied to school-board prayer, it is not surprising that the school boards lost those
two cases.”).
20. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
21. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1999);
Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 (3d Cir. 2011).
22. Coles, 171 F.3d at 385–86; Indian River, 653 F.3d at 290.
23. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: A Revisit, 59 WAYNE L.
REV. 589, 597 (2013) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)) (alteration in
original).
24. See id. (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE PRAYER EXCEPTION
In 1983, the Supreme Court established an important exception to the
Establishment Clause for prayers offered to open meetings of deliberative
public bodies. Part A explains the case in which the exception originated.
Part B points out the questions that the case left open and examines several
federal appellate court decisions on school board prayer practices. Part C
walks through a recent Supreme Court case that clarified the exception.
A.

Where it All Began—Marsh v. Chambers

The Supreme Court carved out an exception to the Establishment
Clause for legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.25 In Marsh, a Nebraska
state legislator challenged the legislature’s “practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer.”26 A chaplain, paid with public money, offered the
daily prayer. A Presbyterian minister had served as chaplain for sixteen
years.27 The district court held that the prayers were permissible but paying
the chaplain out of state funds violated the Establishment Clause.28 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered
the prayer and the form of payment together and struck down the entire
practice as unconstitutional.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that opening meetings
of public legislative bodies with prayers does not violate the Establishment
Clause.30 In its decision, the Court emphasized the historical roots of opening legislative sessions with prayer.31 According to the Court, “historical
evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to
the practice authorized by the First Congress—their actions reveal their intent.”32 Because the First Congress authorized appointing and paying legislative chaplains, and it approved the draft of the First Amendment in the same
week, “[i]t can hardly be thought that . . . [members of Congress] intended
the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what they had just
declared acceptable.”33 The Court recognized that “[i]n light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983).
Id. at 784–85.
Id.
Id. at 785.
Id. at 785–86.
Id. at 791–92.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786–89.
Id. at 790.
Id.
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that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part
of the fabric of our society.”34 Accordingly, the Court held that the Nebraska
Legislature’s prayer practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.35
B.

Questions After Marsh and Federal Appellate Court Decisions on
School Board Prayer Post-Marsh, Pre-Town of Greece
1.

Questions Left Open by Marsh

After the Marsh decision, lower courts struggled to determine the
scope of the decision.36 Much of the confusion stemmed from the language
in the decision that appeared to limit the legislative prayer exception.
First, in Marsh, the Court gave a great deal of weight to the longstanding history of Nebraska’s prayer practice.37 The history of the practice,
alone, did not save it, but the Court indicated that a long-standing historical
tradition should be accorded significant weight.38 Did this mean that prayer
practices without a long history were unconstitutional? How long must a
practice be in place for its history to weigh in favor of constitutionality?
Lower courts were left to guess.
Second, the Court noted that “the individual claiming injury by the
practice is an adult, presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination,’ or peer pressure.”39 Did this mean that prayer practices at events
with students present were unconstitutional?
Third, the Court opened its discussion on the history of legislative
prayer with the following: “The opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country.”40 After the decision, it was unclear what types of
groups qualified as “other deliberative public bodies.” Are city councils
“other deliberative public bodies”? What about school boards? “[T]he only
public bodies other than legislatures to which the [Marsh] Court specifically
refers are the United States courts.”41 Furthermore, the Marsh Court pointed
out that the prayers given in Nebraska “ha[d] [not] been exploited to prose34. Id. at 792.
35. Id. at 795.
36. Marie Elizabeth Wicks, Prayer Is Prologue: The Impact of Town of Greece on the
Constitutionality of Deliberative Public Body Prayer at the Start of School Board Meetings,
31 J.L. & POL. 1, 13 (2015).
37. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (“No more is Nebraska’s practice of over a century, consistent with two centuries of national practice, to be cast aside.”).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 792 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)) (other citations
omitted).
40. Id. at 786.
41. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 380 (6th Cir. 1999).
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lytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”42
Therefore, questions about what prayer content was acceptable were left
open.
2.

Third and Sixth Circuits

After Marsh, several federal appellate courts struck down prayers offered at school board meetings. In Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Board of
Education, the Sixth Circuit held that school board prayer did not fit within
the legislative prayer exception.43 There, the court noted that Supreme Court
school prayer precedent44 and Marsh put the court “squarely between the
proverbial rock and a hard place.”45 As to whether school board prayer
looked more like “school prayers” prohibited by the Supreme Court’s school
prayer precedent or “legislative prayers” allowed by Marsh, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that reasonable minds could differ.46 Nevertheless, the
court found the reasoning of Marsh inapposite.47 The court’s decision rested,
in part, on the questions left open by Marsh. For example, the court relied
heavily on its conclusion that Marsh’s reference to “other deliberative public bodies” did not necessarily include school boards.48 The court explained
that even if school boards were deliberative public bodies, the language in
Marsh did not create a presumption of constitutionality for all prayer practices at meetings of deliberative public bodies.49 Furthermore, the court
found it important that students were involved in the school board meetings.50
In Doe v. Indian River School District, the Third Circuit followed the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Coles.51 The court examined both the Supreme Court’s school prayer precedent and its legislative prayer exception
under Marsh before concluding that the exception did not apply.52 Like in
Coles, student involvement at the school board meetings was critical to the
court’s holding.53 The court criticized the lower court for “ignor[ing]

42. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95.
43. Coles, 171 F.3d at 380–83.
44. Id. at 371. The Court referred specifically to Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
45. Coles, 171 F.3d at 371.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 381.
48. Id. at 380–81.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 382.
51. Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We agree
with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis.”).
52. Id. at 269–82.
53. Id. at 277–81.
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Marsh’s suggestion that the presence of children would affect its calculus.”54
The court tossed Marsh’s “other deliberative public bodies” language aside,
noting that regardless of whether a school board qualifies as a deliberative
public body, “Marsh is ill-suited to this context because the entire purpose
and structure of the Indian River School Board revolves around public
school education.”55
3.

Fifth and Ninth Circuits

The Fifth and Ninth Circuits also struck down school board prayer but
did so for different reasons than the Sixth and Third Circuits.56 Instead of
holding that the legislative exception did not apply to the prayers at issue,
the courts decided the cases on one of the purported limits in Marsh—the
proselytization language.57 As mentioned above, the court in Marsh pointed
out that the prayers at issue were not being used to “proselytize or advance
any one . . . faith or belief.”58 In Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified School District
Board of Education, the Ninth Circuit interpreted that language as a hardand-fast rule that bars sectarian prayer.59 The court stated, “Even assuming
that the school board can be treated like a state legislature, which we do not
decide, its invocations must not ‘advance any one . . . faith or belief.’”60 In
other words, the court assumed that even if the Marsh reasoning applied to
school board prayers, the sectarian nature of the prayers rendered them unconstitutional.61
The Fifth Circuit followed suit in Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board.62 Because the school board prayers at issue were overtly sectarian,
the court did not have to decide whether the legislative prayer exception
from Marsh applied in order to decide the case.63Although the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits decided the aforementioned cases based on the one-sided nature of the school board prayers at issue, that reasoning is no longer viable in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece.64
54. Id. at 280.
55. Id. at 278.
56. Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 52 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir.
2002) (unpublished opinion); Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir.
2006).
57. Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 357; Tangipahoa, 473 F.3d at 204.
58. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).
59. See Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 357.
60. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983)) (alteration in original).
61. Id. at 356.
62. 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006).
63. Id. at 202.
64. See Buckley, supra note 19, at 80–81.

288
C.

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Town of Greece v. Galloway

The Supreme Court of the United States clarified, revived, and expanded the legislative prayer exception in Town of Greece v. Galloway.65 The
Court also rejected the argument of the Ninth and Sixth Circuits in Bacus
and Tangipahoa.66 The town of Greece, New York, opened its monthly town
board meetings with a prayer from a local member of the clergy.67 “The
prayer was intended to place town board members in a solemn and deliberative frame of mind, invoke divine guidance in town affairs, and follow a
tradition practiced by Congress and dozens of state legislatures.”68 Prayer
givers were selected through “an informal method” of calling local congregations listed in a town directory until a clergyman agreed to give that
month’s invocation.69 Because the local population was predominantly
Christian, all the congregations listed in the directory were Christian
churches.70 As a result, many of the prayers offered at Greece’s town board
meetings were given by Christian ministers and were overtly sectarian.71
Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, attendees of the town board meetings,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
New York, alleging that the town board’s prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause.72 The district court upheld the practice as constitutional.73
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.74 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit’s holding.75
The Court emphasized that legislative prayer is a longstanding practice
that “lends gravity to public business, reminds lawmakers to transcend petty
differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.”76 The Court explained its earlier decision
in Marsh before addressing the petitioner’s arguments that the prayer practice was unconstitutional.77 Galloway and Stephens first argued that prayer
must be nonsectarian to avoid running afoul the Establishment Clause.78 In
other words, the prayer cannot be “identifiable with any one religion,” they
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

572 U.S. 565 (2014).
See id. at 578–79.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 593 (Alito, J., concurring).
Galloway, 572 U.S. at 593 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 575.
See Galloway, 572 U.S. at 576–77.
Id. at 577.
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argued.79 The Court rejected that argument, stating that “[a]n insistence on
nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer as a single, fixed standard is not consistent with the tradition of legislative prayer outlined in the Court’s cases.”80 With this pronouncement, the Court effectively overruled Bacus and
Tangipahoa. Those cases had interpreted the proselytization language in
Marsh to bar sectarian prayers.81 However, according to the Court’s reasoning here, a prayer can be sectarian without unconstitutionally advancing one
faith.
Second, the respondents argued that the town’s prayer practice “coerce[d] participation” by meeting attendees.82 The Court was not persuaded.83 Coercing participation is certainly unconstitutional,84 but the Court did
not find that the town of Greece’s prayer practice coerced participation.85
However, a plurality of the Court noted that the calculus would change “if
town board members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled
out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”86
Ultimately, the Town of Greece decision clarified the scope of the legislative prayer exception in several ways. For one, the legislative prayer
exception first announced in Marsh applies not only to Congress and state
legislatures, but also to town councils.87 Furthermore, “[n]owhere did the
Court limit [the exception] specifically to Congress, state legislatures, or
town boards.”88 In other words, the Town of Greece decision clarified that
when the Marsh Court mentioned “other deliberative public bodies,” it
meant it. Second, Town of Greece made clear that a particular prayer practice’s age matters little. The history relevant to the legislative prayer exception is the history of opening legislative meetings generally with prayer. In
other words, the history of a prayer practice is analyzed at a fairly high level
of generality. Despite the fact that Greece’s prayer practice was implemented in 1999, it was still permitted. Additionally, the Town of Greece decision
clarified that the presence of students is not the coup de grâce for prayer

79. Id. at 578.
80. Id.
81. See sources cited supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text.
82. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 586.
83. Id. at 587.
84. Id. at 586 (citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)).
85. Id. at 587.
86. Id. at 588.
87. See id. at 591.
88. Chino Valley II, 910 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 2018) (opinion respecting the denial
of rehearing en banc) (citing Galloway, 572 U.S. at 574–76.); Galloway, 572 U.S. 565.
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practices. Students were often present at the town board meetings;89 nevertheless, the Court found the prayers given there to be constitutional.90
Town of Greece also made clear that Marsh was not a one-off decision.
Instead, the legislative prayer exception is broader than originally thought.
To some, Town of Greece “muddied the waters.”91 Rather than a relatively
easy decision under the Supreme Court’s public school prayer cases, courts
are now faced with two tracks of Supreme Court jurisprudence—one that
strikes down almost all prayer practices surrounding public schools, and one
that upholds prayer practices under the legislative prayer exception. Town of
Greece answered several of the questions left open by Marsh and provided
guidance that is necessary to decide cases involving prayers at school board
meetings. The question in every school board prayer case “is whether this
case is essentially more a legislative-prayer case or a school-prayer matter.”92 And the answer is clearer after Town of Greece.
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT POST-TOWN OF GREECE
After the Supreme Court breathed new life into the legislative prayer
exception in Town of Greece, the constitutionality of school board prayer
deserved new attention. Both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits took up school
board prayer cases. Part A explains the Fifth Circuit’s decision, in which it
heeded the guidance of the Supreme Court in Town of Greece. Part B describes the Ninth Circuit’s decision, in which it stuck closely to the Supreme
Court’s earlier school prayer cases. Part C examines Judge O’Scannlain’s
opinion after the Ninth Circuit refused to grant rehearing en banc of its
school board prayer case.
A.

American Humanist Association v. McCarty

The first major challenge to school board prayer post-Town of Greece
reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2017.93
Birdville Independent School District had a policy of inviting students to
deliver statements of their choice before school board meetings.94 The
statements could include prayers, and often did.95 Isaiah Smith, a Birdville
alumnus who had attended school board meetings, felt offended by the

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Galloway, 572 U.S. at 624 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 591–92.
Buckley, supra note 19, at 72.
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2017).
See id.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 524.
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prayers.96 Smith and the American Humanist Association brought suit. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, finding that the legislative prayer exception applied.97
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the challenged school board prayer practice fit within the legislative exception and, therefore, did not violate
the Constitution.98 The court highlighted both traditional Establishment
Clause tests and the legislative prayer exception before acknowledging that
the key question was “whether this case is essentially more a legislativeprayer case or a school-prayer matter.”99 On the one hand, the case involved
invocations to open the meetings of a deliberative public body. On the other
hand, the case involved government-sanctioned invocations by students on
school property.100 The court ultimately decided that a school board is more
like a legislature, and therefore, prayers to open school board meetings fit
within the legislative prayer exception.101 The court cited several reasons for
its conclusion. Perhaps the most important reason was that the school board
is a deliberative public body that performs primarily legislative tasks, such
as “adopting budgets, collecting taxes, conducting elections, [and] issuing
bonds.”102 The court also pointed out that the invocations were appropriately
respectful.103 Lastly, school board meeting attendees were free to leave at
any time, and there was no discouragement from leaving or voicing protest.104
The plaintiffs advanced three major arguments for their position that
the prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause.105 First, they asserted
that the prayers had to be directed only at lawmakers and for their benefit
alone.106 Second, they argued that the prayer practice at issue did not have a
long-standing historical tradition.107 Third, they claimed that the presence of
students at the school board meetings made the case more like the cases
involving school prayers than legislative prayers.108 The court rejected all
three arguments. In rejecting the argument that the prayers had to be directed only at lawmakers, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs had mis-

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 523–24.
Id. at 525.
McCarty, 851 F.3d at 529–30.
Id. at 525–26.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id.
McCarty, 851 F.3d at 526.
Id. at 526–27.
Id.
Id. at 527.
Id.
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understood the Town of Greece decision.109 There, the Supreme Court noted
that lawmakers were the “principal audience” for the prayers, not the only
audience.110 With respect to the plaintiffs’ argument that there was no historical tradition of prayers at public school board meetings, the court cited
Marsh and Town of Greece for the proposition that there is “a wellestablished practice of opening meetings of deliberative bodies with invocations.”111 Opening school board meetings with prayer was consistent with
that tradition.112 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the presence of
students at the meetings distinguished this case from Marsh and Town of
Greece, the court noted that the Supreme Court applied the legislative prayer exception in Town of Greece despite the presence of children at the town
board meetings.113
In Part IV of the opinion, the court brushed off the decisions of the
Sixth and Third Circuits in Coles and Indian River because those cases were
decided before Town of Greece and because they were distinguishable. In
Coles, a student sat as a member of the school board, and in Indian River,
student government representatives were required to attend school board
meetings in their official capacities.114
B.

Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Chino Valley Unified School
District Board of Education

After the McCarty decision and the Town of Greece decision on which
it relied, whether prayers offered before school board meetings were constitutional seemed like an answered question. The Ninth Circuit thought otherwise.
In 2014, the Freedom From Religion Foundation sued the Chino Valley
Unified School District Board of Education.115 For years, the Chino Valley
Board had allowed invocations to open its public meetings.116 The board was
made up of five adult members elected by voters in the school district and
an appointed student member.117 The meetings were divided into a private
portion during which the board handled matters such as student discipline,
and a public session during which the board handled its other general gov109. Id. at 527–28.
110. McCarty, 851 F.3d at 527 (citing Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587
(2014)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 527–28.
114. Id. at 528.
115. Chino Valley I, 896 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 2018).
116. Id. at 1138–39.
117. Id.
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erning duties.118 These duties included approving fundraisers, textbooks,
fieldtrips, and facility improvement projects.119 Sometimes students or classes would make presentations, or the board would highlight student
achievements.120 The public sessions opened with a report by the board president, a presentation of the colors, and an opening prayer.121 The meetings
also included a public comment period.122
The opening prayers were offered pursuant to a policy that the board
adopted in 2013.123 Under the policy, the prayer was to be offered “by an
eligible member of the clergy or a religious leader in the boundaries of the
district.”124 Clergy were scheduled on a first-come, first-serve, or otherwise
random basis, and the designee was required to “make every reasonable
effort to ensure that a variety of eligible invocational speakers [were] scheduled.”125 Freedom From Religion Foundation, two parents of students in the
district, and twenty Doe plaintiffs filed suit challenging the prayer policy
and practice.126 After the district court ruled against the school board, the
board appealed.127
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the board’s prayer practice and
policy did not fit within the legislative prayer exception and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.128 According to the court, the school board
meetings “function as extensions of the educational experience of the district’s public schools.”129 Thus, the traditional Establishment Clause cases
control.130
The court’s most important reason for deciding that the practice did not
fit within the exception was that the presence of large numbers of children,
who are especially “vulnerable to outside influence,” raises greater Establishment Clause concerns than those in Marsh and Town of Greece.131 Because students are more susceptible to coercion and undue influence, the
school board’s prayer practice was particularly suspect.132 This is the same
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Id.
Id. at 1138.
Id.
Chino Valley I, 896 F.3d at 1138.
Id.
Id. at 1139.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1139–40 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1137.
Chino Valley I, 896 F.3d at 1141.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1145.
See id.
Id. at 1145–46 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593–94 (1992)).
Id. at 1145.
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reasoning that the Supreme Court used in earlier school prayer cases.133 The
court noted that the Marsh and Town of Greece decisions contained language emphasizing that adults are less susceptible to peer pressure than
children.134 The presence of children at the Chino Valley Board meetings
apparently changed the character of the meetings such that they were not
akin to the state legislative meetings in Marsh or the town board meetings in
Town of Greece.135
The court also reasoned that school boards “exercise control and authority over the student population.”136 According to the court, the relationship between the school board and the students is substantially different than
the relationship between either a state legislature and its constituents or a
town council and its citizens.137 Students’ lack of autonomy creates heightened constitutional concerns.138 And the court asserted that the students’
presence at the board meetings was not voluntary in any meaningful way.139
The court’s third major assertion was that prayer at public school board
meetings was not supported by historical tradition.140 Public education was
unheard of at the time of the Constitution’s framing.141 Therefore, historical
traditions did not support the school board prayer practice in the same way
that they supported prayers opening state legislative sessions and town
board meetings, according to the court.142
The Ninth Circuit also came to conclusions that focused on the nature
of school board meetings. According to the court, “[t]he Board’s meetings
are not solely a venue for policymaking[;] they are also a site of academic
and extracurricular activity and an adjudicative forum for student discipline.”143 The “nature of the Board’s mandate” made it fundamentally different from legislative sessions or town board meetings.144 For these reasons,
the court concluded that the legislative prayer exception was inapplicable.
Therefore, the court applied one of the traditional Establishment Clause
tests.145 Unsurprisingly, the court deemed the prayer practice unconstitutional.146
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The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the Coles and Indian River decisions.147 The court’s reliance on those decisions gave the impression that a
circuit split already existed and that the Ninth Circuit was siding with the
weight of authority. However, those decisions predated the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway.148 Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chino Valley, the only federal appellate court to consider
the constitutionality of school board prayer after Town of Greece was the
Fifth Circuit in McCarty.
C.

Denial of Rehearing En Banc and Judge O’Scannlain’s “Dissent”

After the panel decision, the Chino Valley School Board petitioned for
the Ninth Circuit to grant rehearing en banc.149 The court denied the request
for rehearing.150 Senior Circuit Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain authored a
lengthy opinion in protest of the court’s denial.151 Seven other judges joined
O’Scannlain’s opinion.152 Judge O’Scannlain explained the Supreme Court’s
decision in Marsh and its recent reaffirmation of the legislative prayer exception in Town of Greece.153 According to Judge O’Scannlain, the Ninth
Circuit ignored the clear instruction of those Supreme Court cases and “disparage[d] such well-established precedent.”154
Judge O’Scannlain addressed each of the panel’s main assertions. With
respect to the panel’s contention about the presence of children at the board
meetings, O’Scannlain retorted that the mere presence of students at the
board meetings did not change the board’s legislative nature.155 Moreover,
the Supreme Court had no problem with the presence of children at the town
board meetings in Town of Greece.156 Judge O’Scannlain carried the panel’s
assertion to its logical conclusion to demonstrate the argument’s folly:
“Does the panel mean to suggest that the legislative prayer tradition is constitutional on days when no student is present as a visitor, award recipient,
or volunteer, but suddenly becomes unconstitutional on days when students
are present?”157
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Id. at 1144 n.9; Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
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Id. at 1300.
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As to the panel’s reasoning that the school district, and by extension
the school board, exercised control over the students, Judge O’Scannlain
quipped, “What nonsense!”158 O’Scannlain asserted that the students enjoyed a great deal of autonomy during the meetings—they were not required
to attend the meetings, nor were they discouraged from coming and going as
they pleased.159
Judge O’Scannlain again used strong language in rejecting the panel’s
assertion that historical tradition did not support prayer in public school
boards, calling it “absurd” to assume that because public education did not
widely exist at the time of the founding, history did not support the prayers
before school boards.160 The test is, in fact, whether the prayer practice fits
within the historical tradition of legislative prayer, not whether there is a
long history of the specific prayer practice at issue.161 This is supported by
both the Marsh case and the Town of Greece case. As mentioned above, the
prayer practice at issue in Town of Greece was not implemented until
1999.162 There, despite the specific practice’s youth, it fit within the legislative prayer tradition.163
Judge O’Scannlain responded to the panel’s conclusion that the nature
of school boards was different than that of legislatures or town boards by
simply disagreeing. The school board is a governing body whose primary
job is to legislate school district policy rather than educate students, according to O’Scannlain.164
V. WHERE DOES SCHOOL BOARD PRAYER FIT?
The Town of Greece decision made it clear that the legislative prayer
exception announced in Marsh covers more than just the meetings of state
legislatures. It is broad enough to cover public school board meetings, and
many of the apparent limitations on the exception were rejected by the Court
in Town of Greece. Accordingly, if the Supreme Court takes up a question
on the constitutionality of a prayer practice to open school board meetings,
the Court should apply the Marsh and Town of Greece cases. Both the Fifth
Circuit and Judge O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit got the hint from the
Supreme Court and put school board prayer under the rubric of Marsh and
Town of Greece.
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First, school board prayer fits within the legislative prayer cases because school boards are deliberative public bodies. The Marsh Court captured the essence of its decision in the following sentence: “The opening of
sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is
deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.”165 The Court’s
inclusion of “other deliberative public bodies” in that sentence is of great
importance.166 Although it was not clear to lower courts at the time, the
Court’s inclusion of “other deliberative public bodies” demonstrated that its
decision was not limited to state legislatures. Indeed, the Supreme Court
recognized in Town of Greece that prayers before other deliberative public
bodies fit within the legislative prayer exception.167 Therefore, the question
after Town of Greece is whether school boards are deliberative public bodies
to be included within the legislative prayer exception. In McCarty, the Fifth
Circuit put it this way: Is “a school board . . . more like a legislature than a
school classroom or event”?168
The most important piece of this comparison is an analysis of purpose.169 That is, what is a school board’s primary purpose? School boards
“exist[] to legislate school district policy.”170 School boards are governing
bodies with duties that include “overseeing the district’s public schools,
adopting budgets, collecting taxes, conducting elections, issuing bonds, and
other tasks that are undeniably legislative.”171 School boards “conduct the
business affairs” of public schools.172 While it is true that school board meetings often take place on school property, “[n]one of the case law prohibiting
prayer in public schools has focused on the titleholder to the real estate.”173
The location of a meeting does not change its purpose. Because a school
board’s primary purpose is legislative, it is a deliberative public body, and
school board prayer practices should be evaluated under the Marsh and
Town of Greece decisions.
By contrast, school classrooms and most school events serve no legislative function. That is not to say that events with hybrid purposes are necessarily deliberative public bodies to which the legislative prayer exception
applies. For example, consider a meeting during school between the school
165. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
166. James Mann Wherley, Jr., Casenote, Transforming a School Board Meeting into a
Student Council Meeting: Coles v. Cleveland Board of Education, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359,
1381 (2000).
167. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 591–92.
168. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2017).
169. Chino Valley II, 910 F.3d at 1302.
170. Id.
171. See McCarty, 851 F.3d at 526.
172. Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369, 387 (6th Cir. 1999)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 388.
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board president, the principal, some faculty members, and a few student
representatives, in which they discuss the school’s budget, consider ways to
improve student test scores, and get student feedback about a reading program. The budget piece of the meeting is, in the words of the McCarty court,
“undeniably legislative,” but the discussion about test scores and the reading
program looks much more educational in nature. Even in a murky situation
like this, an examination of the primary purpose of the meeting yields a result with relative ease: the meeting is not one of a deliberative public body.
The primary purpose of school boards, on the other hand, is clearly legislative. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never heard a case on the constitutionality of opening a meeting like the hypothetical meeting above with a
prayer. Instead, the school prayer precedent that declared prayer practices
unconstitutional has been limited to situations in which the event in question
served almost no legislative function. School board meetings are on the opposite end of the purpose spectrum, and the fact that their primary purpose is
legislative makes them deliberative public bodies to which the legislative
prayer cases apply.
Judge Ryan, in his dissent in Coles, explained the following “syllogism
derived from Marsh”: “There is no constitutional bar to ‘opening . . . sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer.’ But the
Cleveland Board of Education is a ‘deliberative public bod[y].’ Therefore,
there is no constitutional bar to ‘opening . . . sessions of [the Cleveland
Board of Education] with prayer.’”174 Any public school board could substitute its name into the syllogism. The legislative nature of school board meetings makes them fundamentally different than the school events where the
Supreme Court has struck down prayer practices. Unlike graduation ceremonies or football games, school board meetings primarily serve a legislative function.
Additionally, “school board meetings . . . do not ‘implicate the underlying concerns which have led the Supreme Court to apply the Establishment
Clause strictly to school-related functions, i.e., the potential coercion of impressionable students and the mandatory or quasi-mandatory nature of student attendance.’”175 The impressionability of students and their lack of
choice in attendance at school and some school events have played a major
role in the Supreme Court’s school prayer jurisprudence.176 But those concerns are significantly reduced in the case of school board meetings. School
board meetings are aimed at and designed primarily for parents rather than
174. Id. at 388 (alterations in original).
175. See Buckley, supra note 19, at 84 (quoting Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 950 F.
Supp. 1337, 1346 (N.D. Ohio 1996)).
176. Wherley, supra note 166, at 1387–89; see supra notes 12–19 and accompanying
text.
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students. Of course, students may be present at school board meetings, but
Town of Greece demonstrated that the presence of children is insufficient to
establish unconstitutionality. In that case, “the Supreme Court . . . expressly
upheld the practice of legislative prayer at town board meetings at which
students are present.”177
Further, as a practical matter, far fewer children attend school board
meetings than the activities that the Supreme Court dealt with in its school
prayer cases, such as graduation ceremonies. Moreover, the presence of
children alone does not change a meeting’s purpose or character.178 As far as
attendance goes, attendance at a school board meeting by students is far
from mandatory.179 Students are free to come and go as they please without
fear of consequence. Therefore, the risk that children will be coerced into
religious participation at a school board meeting is fairly low. Because the
heightened concerns surrounding school activities are not implicated with
school board meetings, there is little reason to treat school board prayer just
like prayer practices during other school events.
Lastly, invocations to open a school board meeting fit within the historical tradition set out in Marsh. As explained by the Supreme Court in Town
of Greece and by Judge O’Scannlain in his opinion, the issue isn’t whether
there is a longstanding historical tradition of the specific prayer practice in
question. Instead, the issue is whether the specific prayer practice fits within
the historical tradition of legislative prayers. Just like the Greece town council’s practice of opening its meetings with prayers, opening school board
meetings with prayers fits within the historical tradition of beginning meetings of deliberative public bodies with prayers. The prayers are designed to
lend gravity to the upcoming task of governing the school district. It is difficult to find constitutionally significant differences between town board
meetings and school board meetings.
Beyond these straightforward, logical reasons for concluding that
school board prayers fit within the legislative prayer cases, the conclusion
also follows from a sort of impressionistic inquiry. If one were to simply ask
a friend if a school board meeting was more like a school event or a meeting
of a deliberative public body, the friend’s intuitive response would likely be
“a deliberative public body.” Put another way, if one was asked to put a
school board meeting into either the school event category (e.g., classroom
activity, graduation ceremony, high school football game, etc.) or the deliberative public body category (e.g., state legislature, city council, etc.), the
latter category makes the most sense. Of course, these claims do not have
177. Chino Valley II, 910 F.3d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590–91 (2014)).
178. Id. at 1301.
179. Wherley, supra note 166, at 1389.
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empirical support, but nevertheless, this sort of impressionistic inquiry into
what a school board looks like is useful. And the intuitive response to the
inquiry is that a school board meeting looks more like a state legislature or
town council; therefore, prayers at those meetings fit within the exception.
VI. MEANINGFUL LIMITS ON THE LEGISLATIVE PRAYER EXCEPTION
While school board prayer should be analyzed under the legislative
prayer cases rather than school prayer precedent, not every school board
prayer practice will survive constitutional scrutiny. There are meaningful
limits on the legislative prayer exception.
To start, the prayer practice cannot “denigrate nonbelievers or religious
minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion.”180 This limit is not a
mandate that the prayers be nonsectarian.181 The prayers need only serve the
purpose of solemnizing the occasion.182 Prayers that are “solemn and respectful in tone”183 and that occur at the beginning of a school board meeting
would pass the test, while a “pattern of prayers that over time denigrate,
proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose” would fail.184
Further, prayer givers must be selected through nondiscriminatory
means. In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
court’s assertion that the town of Greece had violated the Establishment
Clause by inviting predominantly Christian ministers.185 The Supreme Court
stated that “[s]o long as the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination,
the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for nonChristian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.” 186 However, a prayer policy or practice of choosing prayer givers based on religious
bias or favoritism is unlikely to pass constitutional muster.187 Indeed, Justice
Alito noted in his concurrence in Town of Greece that he would have viewed
the case differently if certain congregations were left out intentionally.188
A third limit is that prayers to open public school board meetings must
not be unconstitutionally coercive. In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court
recognized “that government may not coerce its citizens ‘to support or par-

180. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 583 (2014).
181. The Town of Greece court explicitly rejected the suggestion that prayers had to be
nonsectarian to be constitutional. Id. at 578–85.
182. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 583.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 585.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 585–86.
187. See id. at 593 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[R]espondents do not claim that the list was
attributable to religious bias or favoritism.”).
188. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring).
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ticipate in any religion or its exercise.’”189 The Court simply was not persuaded on the facts of the case that the prayer practice at issue was sufficiently coercive to violate the Establishment Clause.190 Implicit in this
statement is an acknowledgment that there could be certain facts in a case
that render a prayer practice unconstitutionally coercive.191 A plurality of the
Court agreed that “[t]he analysis would be different if town board members
directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for
opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”192 Presumably, this kind of
conduct would be unconstitutionally coercive.
There is a fourth limit on school board prayer that is related to the coercion limitation—prayers at school board meetings should be directed primarily at school board members.193 In a portion of the Town of Greece opinion, Justice Kennedy highlighted the fact that “[t]he principal audience for
these invocations is not . . . the public but lawmakers themselves, who may
find that a moment of prayer or quiet reflection sets the mind to a higher
purpose and thereby eases the task of governing.”194 Accordingly, prayers to
open school board meetings should be aimed primarily at the school board
members themselves, with an eye toward helping them perform their legislative duties. Of course, that is not to suggest that the prayers must be directed
only at school board members. That precise argument failed in McCarty.195
Justice Kennedy also pointed out that “many members of the public find
these prayers meaningful and wish to join them.”196 Public participation does
not mean that the prayer necessarily violates this limit.
Because of the meaningful limits on prayer practices evaluated under
Marsh and Town of Greece, putting school board prayer under the legislative prayer rubric is entirely reasonable. Although school board prayer falls
under the legislative prayer exception, not every prayer practice will pass
constitutional muster. A violation of the limits set out in Marsh and Town of
Greece will render the practice unconstitutional.

189. Id. at 586 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
190. Id. at 587.
191. There was not a majority on the coercion holding. Justices Thomas and Scalia argued that the coercion that is relevant to an Establishment Clause analysis is legal coercion.
Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
192. Id. at 588 (plurality).
193. See id. at 587.
194. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 587. (This portion of the opinion garnered only a plurality.)
195. See sources cited supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
196. Galloway, 572 U.S. at 588.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Without a Supreme Court decision on school board prayer, the constitutionality of prayer before public school board meetings still sits on the
proverbial fence between the Court’s school prayer jurisprudence and its
decisions regarding the legislative prayer exception. But the Court’s recent
decision in Town of Greece pushed school board prayer practices toward the
legislative prayer exception and constitutionality. Both the Fifth Circuit and
Judge O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit got the hint from the Supreme Court.
The question of whether school board prayers fit within the legislative
prayer exception should be resolved under the legislative prayer cases.
School boards are public deliberative bodies, school board meetings do not
implicate the concerns that led to the Supreme Court’s school prayer decisions, and school board prayers align with the historical tradition of legislative prayers; therefore, prayers at school boards fit within the legislative
prayer exception. Further, there are meaningful constitutional limits on
school board prayer practices even under the legislative prayer exception—
school board prayer practices may not unconstitutionally denigrate unbelievers or coerce participation, prayer givers must be selected in a nondiscriminatory fashion, and prayers should be directed primarily at school
board members. Just like that, the school board prayer puzzle is solved.
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